
On Slashdot and several blogs, many people have commented on our product name and our definition of it: LINA is not an acronym or LINA Is Not an Acronym. Most of the commentary is true – LINA is intended as a humorous pun on standard free software naming conventions (GNU’s not Unix, WINE is not an emulator, etc.) and the name LINA was chosen originally because we liked the sound of it.
LINA is also a recursive mathematical paradox about truth and is meant as a tribute to a twentieth century mathematician: Kurt Godel. Kurt Godel is famous for his incompleteness theorems, two of the deepest proofs in mathematics.
To understand their significance we have to step back in time to the city of Vienna, the cultural and intellectual center of the world in the early twentieth century. Godel was part of one of the most famous philosophy clubs in history: the Vienna Circle. Many of the great thinkers of Vienna were part of the Circle: Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, and Otto Neurath among others.

With the exception of Godel, the Vienna Circle believed in a philosophy known as logical positivism. One of the core tenets of logical positivism is that a statement could only be true if there was a finite set of steps that could verity its truth. This tenet may seem innocuous, but it was a wrecking ball to many standard metaphysical, scientific, and theological beliefs. God, numbers, and many other entities were eliminated because they could not be proven in a finite number of steps.
Godel was a skeptic of logical positivism. As a mathematical platonist, he believed the entities he worked with – integers, logical statements, irrational numbers, derivatives, curls, etc. – did not just exist in his mind, but in a separate mathematical reality. Many mathematicians, even today, are mathematical platonists. They do not believe that they are playing language games when they make mathematical discoveries, but discovering truths about the objects in this mathematical reality. The physicist Roger Penrose, whose illustration appears below, is a mathematical platonist as is Martin Gardner.
Godel wanted to prove that mathematical platonism was true. Historically, such an endeavor would have been philosophical, but Godel wanted to find a mathematical answer to the metaphysics of mathematics. This was an extraordinary goal because while the tools of mathematics are useful in discovering the properties of mathematical objects, it was not at all clear how they could be used to answer questions of their existence in an independent reality.

His approach was quite beautiful. If mathematical objects did not exist independently, then they should be definable solely in terms of what could be proven about them. That is, they should have no properties outside of the system being used to examine them. So if Godel could prove that that some mathematical objects always had properties that could not be proven in whatever formal system they were being examined in, then he could prove that those mathematical objects were independent of the systems being used to examine them. This proof would demonstrate, Godel believed, that mathematical objects had an independent existence.
In his incompleteness theorems, Godel began by creating a metalanguage in the natural numbers (whole numbers greater than zero) that encode proofs as arithmetical statements concerning the natural numbers. This allowed arithmetical statements to be statements about mathematics: i.e., it allowed mathematics to talk about itself. He then encoded the statement “This statement is not provable” as an arithmetical statement. The not-provable statement was a mathematical variant of the liar’s paradox (”This statement is not true”, “All Cretans are liars”, etc.). If it was provable, then there would be a contradiction in the system since it asserted it was not – a fatal flaw. If it was not provable, then the system would be incomplete (unable to prove all of the properties of its objects). Since the statement was also an arithmetical statement concerning the natural numbers, that meant that an arithmetical statement that was not provable could always be constructed in any consistent system rich enough to contain the natural numbers.
In this way, these incompleteness theorems proved that the natural numbes always had properties that could not be proven in any formal system rich enough to contain them. They directly disproved logical positivism and, as explained above, Godel believed they also demonstrated the truth of mathematical platonism. Whether or not one accepts this interpretation, Godel’s use of the tools of mathematics to make metaphysical arguments about the existence of mathematical objects is beautiful, astonishing, and utterly unique.
As a tribute to Godel, LINA uses the liar paradox, but in a different way. LINA is a recursive expansion that at each level is paradoxical in the form of a liar’s paradox (LINA Is Not an Acronym). What makes it interesting is that as the expansion of LINA approaches infinite recursion it suddenly flips and the entire definition becomes true. Let’s start with some examples to pump our intuition.
In the first expansion of LINA, we have:
LINA = LINA is not an acronym
In the second expansion:
(LINA is not an acronym) INA = (LINA)INA = LINAINA
And in the third:
(LINA is not an acronym) INAINA = (LINA)INAINA = LINAINAINA
At this point, we have a good idea what is happening. Each time we expand LINA to LINA is not an acronym, the statement is paradoxical at that point. However, at the next expansion, the L is pushed back and the statement at the previous expansion becomes true since INA != LINA.
Since the above expansions are strings not numbers, we can turn them around without loss of generality and index positions in the expansion string from right to left rather than left to right. This will allow the L to be pushed away from us positionally, rather than towards us. For example, in the second expansion of LINA, the L would be at position 7:
L I N A I N A
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
whereas in the third expansion it would be at position 10:
L I N A I N A I N A
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
If it helps, one can picture the expansion happening from left to right instead.
A N I A N I L
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
With this positioning, it now becomes clear that as the acronym expands, the L gets pushed farther and farther out. We now have all of the pieces needed to examine LINA formally. Let’s define an acronym operator A that recursively expands an acronym. We can represent the nth expansion of LINA as:

… 
By our numbering system, in the above formula, L would be at the (n*3) + 1 position. Assume now that L appears in the expansion as n approaches
. Then this must mean that there must be some position k that L is guaranteed to always appear before as the expansion occurs. But this is false, because we can simply set n to k%3+1 and that will push the L past position k. In this way, for any k in the natural numbers, we can always prove that L does not appear at that position. Thus, L is not in the infinite expansion of LINA. More formally, the limit as n approaches infinity of the nth expansion of LINA is:
=
= INAINAINAINA…
So, the paradox disappears as you approach infinity because there is no L in the expansion. LINA is not an acronym. Nor for that matter are GNU, HURD, WINE, etc. The first letter in all of these acronyms is eliminated as they approach infinite expansion for the same reasons that:

0.9999 … = 1
The most popular book on Godel – which contains some wonderful analogies – is the Pulitzer Prize winning Godel, Escher, Bach by Douglas R. Hofstadter. The Dover version of Godel’s original proof and a highly recommended exposition of the proof by Ernst Nagel et. al can be found on Amazon. Different versions and perspectives on the liar paradox can be found in this Wikipedia article. Although some have complained about its mathematical inaccuracies and speculative psychology, I nonetheless throughly enjoyed Rebecca Goldstein book on Godel and the Vienna Circle, Incompleteness.